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   We often utter imperatives in our daily conversation, for example, to command or forbid something. It 
is cross-linguistically observed that the interpretation of the imperatives differs depending on the context 
in which they are uttered. According to Donhauser (1986), there are several speech acts associated with 
German imperatives. For example, while German imperatives such as lies das! ‘read this!,’ can be used as 
commands in some situations, it is also possible to see German imperatives which can be used as a 
request, such as dreh bitte das Licht ab ‘turn off the light, please.’ In Japanese, the meanings of 
imperatives can also change depending on situations. Consider (1). 
 
(1) a. (Yasai-mo)    tabenasai! 
  vegetable-too  eat-IMP.POL  
  ‘Eat (vegetables), too!’ 
b. (Rooka-o)  hashiru-na!  
  hall-ACC  run-NEG.IMP 
    ‘Do not run in the hallway!’ 
                 
    As for (1a), imagine the following situation. Jiro does not like vegetables, but his mother wants him 
to eat them. During their lunch, Jiro ate everything but the vegetables on his plate. In such a situation, 
Jiro’s mother might say (1a) (yasaimo) tabenasai! ‘eat (vegetables), too!’ to make Jiro eat vegetables. In 
this context, (1a) generates the interpretation ‘eat (vegetables), too!,’ which is the same as the literal 
meaning of (1a). The imperative (1b) can be uttered when a teacher meets a student who is running in the 
hallway although there are a lot of other people walking around there. Then, the teacher might say to the 
student (1b) (rooka-o) hashiruna! ‘do not run in the hallway!’ to forbid running in the hallway. In this 
context, too, the imperative (1b) generates the interpretation ‘do not run in the hallway!,’ which is the 
same as its literal meaning. What (1a) and (1b) have in common is that they both are interpreted to mean 
the same as their literal meanings. 
    On the other hand, the examples in (2) act differently from (1) in terms of the interpreted meaning.  
 
(2) a. Baka   i-e!1 
     stupid  say-IMP 
     ‘lit. Say a stupid thing!’ 
b. Uso  tsuk-e!  
     lie   tell-IMP 
     ‘lit. Tell a lie!’ 
       
The imperatives in (2) can generate the reverse interpretation to the literal meaning in certain situations. A 
possible situation for (2a) is as follows. Suppose that Jiro has not started writing his thesis yet. Despite 
this situation, he says ‘I bet I will be able to finish my senior thesis in just three days!’ In such a case, 
John might say to him (2a) baka ie! ‘say a stupid thing!’ immediately after Jiro’s utterance, to accuse him 
of having a stupid attitude toward the senior thesis. While the literal meaning of (2a) is ‘say a stupid 
thing,’ the interpreted meaning is more likely to be the reverse to the literal meaning, that is, ‘don’t say a 
stupid thing.’ The example (2a) indicates that, unlike the examples in (1), the literal meaning and its 
interpretation are not identical. The example (2b) is the same as (2a) in this respect. The example (2b) can 
be uttered in the following context. Mary went to a concert after school. Therefore, Mary did not have 
time for homework. Nevertheless, she tells her friend Hanako that she has finished her homework the 
next day. Since Hanako knows that Mary went to the concert, Hanako could not believe what Mary said. 
In such a case, Hanako might say to Mary (2b) uso tsuke! ‘tell a lie!’ immediately after Hanako heard that 
Mary has finished her homework, to accuse Mary of telling a lie. The interpreted meaning of (2b) can be 
                                                   
1 The abbreviations in the glosses in this paper are: ACC＝accusative, IMP＝imperative, NEG＝negation, POL＝
politeness marker, PROG＝progressive, SFP＝sentence final particle. 
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‘do not tell a lie,’ whereas the literal meaning is ‘tell a lie.’ In this case, too, there is no accordance 
between the interpreted meaning and the literal meaning of (2b). Therefore, (2b) also generates the 
reverse interpretation of its literal meaning.  
    Since the reverse interpretation is not generated in imperatives in the ordinary use, I would call the 
imperatives in (2) rhetorical imperatives (RIs) in this thesis. By contrast, I will call imperatives in the 
ordinary use such as the examples in (1) ordinary imperatives (OIs). This paper aims to reveal how the 
reverse interpretation is generated in RIs, from the viewpoints of semantics and pragmatics. This paper 
consists of the following sections. Section 2 investigates the conditions of appropriate use of OIs and RIs. 
Section 3 is the review of a previous study, Kaufmann (2012). Section 4 is the analysis of RIs, based on 
the previous study. Section 5 deals with the process of the interpretation of the reverse meaning on the 
pragmatic level. Section 6 presents a conclusion. 
 
2. The Appropriate Use of OIs and RIs 
 
2.1   The Appropriate Use of OIs   This section deals with the appropriate use of OIs. Consider (3).  
 
(3) a. Ne-nasai! 
  sleep-IMP.POL 
  ‘Go to bed!’ 
b. (Shiryoo-o) yom-inasai! 
     material-ACC read-IMP.POL 
     ‘Read the material!’ 
 
As an example of a possible context for (3a), imagine that John stays up late because he is playing a game, 
but his mother wants him to stop playing the game and go to bed. If (3a) is uttered by the mother in such a 
situation, (3a) generates the interpretation ‘go to bed!,’ which is the same as the literal meaning of (3a). 
As for (3b), suppose the following context. A teacher gave students a reading assignment. However, 
Hanako does not read the material although a week has passed from the due date and the teacher is angry 
about it. If (3b) is uttered by the teacher in such a situation, (3b) generates the interpretation ‘read (the 
material)!,’ which is the same as the literal meaning of (3b). These descriptions for (3a) and (3b) suggest 
that the OIs are uttered under the following two conditions:  
 
(4)  a. Imperatives are uttered before the events described by the imperatives occur.  
  b. The literal meanings of imperatives correspond to the speaker’s preferences.  
(Kaufmann, 2012) 
 
Let us look at the examples in (3) one by one. The example (3a) describes the event in which John goes to 
bed. Since John has not gone to bed when (3a) is uttered, (3a) meets the condition (4a). Also, as pointed 
out previously, John’s mother’s preference here is that John goes to bed. This preference corresponds to 
the literal meaning of (3a). As a result, we can see that (3a) satisfies both conditions in (4). In the case of 
(3b), the event described by the imperative is that Hanako reads the material. Since Hanako has not read it 
when (3b) is uttered, (3b) meets the condition (4a). Furthermore, in the case of (3b), the teacher’s 
preference is that Hanako reads the material to complete the assignment. This preference corresponds to 
the literal meaning of (3b). Thus, (3b) satisfies the condition (4b). As a result, (3b) also satisfies the two 
conditions in (4). What we have seen in the examples in (3) is that both (3a) and (3b) satisfy the 
conditions in (4). This result indicates that OIs satisfy the conditions in (4). 
 
2.2   The Appropriate Use of RIs   This section discusses the appropriate use of RIs, and compares it 
to the use of OIs which we saw in Section 2.1. Consider the examples in (5). 
 
(5) a. Baka   i-e!  
  stupid  say-IMP 
  ‘lit. Say a stupid thing!’ 
b. Uso  tsuk-e!  
  lie   tell-IMP 
  ‘lit. Tell a lie!’ 
 
As shown in the Introduction, the imperatives in (5) can be uttered as RIs in the following conditions. The 
imperative (5a) is uttered by John immediately after Jiro’s ‘stupid’ utterance ‘I bet I will be able to finish 
my senior thesis in just three days!’, to accuse Jiro of having a stupid attitude. The imperative (5b) is 
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uttered by Hanako immediately after she hears that Mary has finished her homework, which is 
unbelievable for Hanako. With the utterance (5b), Hanako accuses Mary of telling a lie. These examples 
indicate that, in contrast to the OIs in (3), the RIs in (5) do not satisfy the two conditions in (4). As for the 
condition (4a), it is pointed out by Mori (2006) that what are called RIs in this paper are uttered after the 
event described by the imperative occurred. I agree with this conclusion. Let us first look at (5a) as an 
example. The event described in (5a) is that Jiro says a stupid thing. In the case of (5a), Jiro has already 
said a stupid thing when (5a) is uttered. It means that the event that Jiro says stupid thing has already 
occurred at the utterance time of (5a). Therefore, it contradicts the condition (4a). Moreover, considering 
that John accuses Jiro’s stupid utterance, John’s preference is that Jiro does not say a stupid thing. This 
preference does not correspond to the literal meaning of (5a), which results in the violation of the 
condition (4b). As a result, both conditions in (4) cannot be satisfied by (5a). The result is the same as in 
the case of (5b). The event described by (5b) is that Mary tells a lie. When (5b) is uttered, Mary has 
already said something unbelievable to Hanako. It means that the event that Mary tells a lie, or more 
precisely, the event in which seems to Hanako that Mary tells a lie, has already taken place at the 
utterance time of (5b). In addition, since Hanako accuses Mary of telling a lie, Hanako’s preference here 
is that Mary did not tell a lie. This preference is in contradiction to the literal meaning of (5b), which 
results in the violation of the condition (4b). As a result, (5b) fails to satisfy both conditions in (4). What 
the RIs in (5) indicate is that, unlike OIs, RIs do not satisfy the conditions in (4). 
    In Section 2, we have explored the appropriate use of OIs and RIs. The finding is that RIs do not 
satisfy two conditions which are satisfied by OIs. That is, unlike OIs, RIs are uttered after the events 
described by the imperatives occurred, and their literal meanings contradict the speaker’s preferences.  
  
3. Previous Study: Kaufmann (2012) 
 
    This section overviews the previous study on imperatives, before analyzing RIs. There are several 
studies on imperatives, such as Portner (2005) or Kaufmann (2012). This paper mainly refers to 
Kaufmann (2012) so that we get the basic idea about imperatives before the analysis of RI. Kaufmann 
(2012) argues that an imperative sentence can be semantically analyzed as a proposition of performative 
you should sentences. For instance, an imperative sentence “close the door!” is semantically denoted as 
“you should close the door.” In his argument, Kaufmann (2012) points out that imperatives usually satisfy 
two presuppositions in the Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint (EUC), and the Ordering Source Restriction 
(OSR). Let us explain them one by one. 
 
3.1   The Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint (EUC)   In this section, I will explain the basic idea of 
the EUC.  
  
(6)  The Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint (EUC)  
 
(Kaufmann, 2012 p.157) 
 
The EUC is a presupposition which means that “issuing an imperative seems to require that the speaker 
believes the thus modalized proposition to be possible, but not necessary. That is, if the speaker is sure 
that φ is going to happen (or will not happen), then issuing an imperative φ! is infelicitous” (Kaufmann, 
2012 p.156). This point is exhibited by “the speaker believes that both ¬p and p are possible” in (6). Look 
at example (7).  
 
(7) # I know that you are going to do this no matter what, so do it also. (Kaufmann, 2012 p.156) 
 
The example (7) shows that the utterance “I know that you are going to do this no matter what, so do it 
also” is infelicitous. The infelicity of this sentence can be explained by the EUC. When we regard the 
imperative “do it also” as “p!,” p depicts an event in which the addressee does it. ¬p depicts instead an 
event in which the addressee does not do it. In order to meet the EUC, both ¬p and p should be 
epistemically possible when (7) is uttered. However, the preceding sentence “I know that you are going to 
do this no matter what” implies that the speaker knows that p will occur. In other words, there remains no 
possibility of ¬p epistemically, and it contradicts the EUC. As a result, the utterance (2) is infelicitous.  
    The EUC can, of course, be used for the analysis of the Japanese OIs. The felicitous OI meets the 
JOPImpK =  f g t P w.(8w0 2 O(fCG(c) [ f, g, cT , w))[P (t)(w0)],
presupposes: the precontext c0 of c is such that for all w 2 CS(c0) :
(9w0 2 Bel0cS (c0T )(w))(9w00 2 Bel0cS (c0T )(w))[¬p(t)(w0) & p(t)(w00)]
(= the speaker believes that both ¬p and p are possible)
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EUC. Consider (8), which is repeated from (1). 
 
(8) (Yasai-mo)  tabe-nasai!  
   eat-too     IMP.POL 
   ‘Eat (vegetables) too!’ 
 
Let us suppose the following context for (8). The imperative (8) is felicitously uttered by Jiro’s mother 
when Jiro ate everything but vegetables on his plate for their lunch, but his mother wants him to eat 
vegetables. When we regard the imperative (8) (yasaimo) tabenasai! ‘eat (vegetables), too!’ as “p!,” p 
depicts an event that Jiro eats the vegetables. ¬p depicts instead an event that Jiro does not eat vegetables. 
When (8) is uttered, both ¬p and p events should be epistemically possible because it is uncertain whether 
Jiro will eat vegetables or not. Thus, the felicitous imperative (8) meets the EUC.  
     
3.2   The Ordering Source Restriction (OSR)   In this section, I will explain the presupposition 
OSR. The OSR is presented by Kaufmann (2012) to explain the relationship between imperatives and 
speaker’s preference. Kaufmann (2012) claims that the ordering source for imperatives, that is, the 
propositions which include a performative modal, are speaker’s preference-related. As a matter of fact, 
however, imperatives do not always correspond to the speaker’s preference. Think about the advice 
imperatives’ case with the example (9) below.  
 
(9)   A: How do I get to Harlem?  
  B: Take the A-train. 
  B’: #Take the A-train but I don’t want you to do this. (Kaufmann, 2012 p. 159) 
    
In the example (9), the imperative B acts as an advice to the question A. In this case, the imperative “take 
the A-train” does not need to correspond the speaker’s preference. In other words, it is possible that the 
speaker of B does not care if the speaker of A will not take A-train. In contrast to B, the imperative B’, 
which is followed by the sentence “but I don’t want you to do this” is infelicitous. What B’ indicates is 
that, although imperatives do not always correspond to the speaker’s preference, it is infelicitous if it is 
overtly expressed that the speaker does not prefer the event described by the imperative. Based on the 
descriptions for (9), we amount to saying that imperatives can be uttered although the speaker personally 
does not prefer the event described by the imperative in certain cases. However, in such cases, it is 
infelicitous if it is overtly expressed that the speaker does not prefer the event described by the imperative. 
In order to explain such a trait regarding imperatives and the speaker’s preference, the OSR is presented 
as follows: 
 
(10)  The Ordering Source Restriction (OSR) 
  
(Kaufmann, 2012 p.160) 
 
As shown in (10), two conditions are supposed with respect to the relationship between imperatives and 
the speaker’s preference. Let us first consider the definition of the OSR (i). The OSR (i) is applicable to 
imperatives linking to salient decision problems, situations where whether or not the event described by 
the imperative will occur is under the addressee’s control. For such cases, the ordering sources for the 
imperatives are the prioritizing ones. In other words, the ordering sources for the imperatives are the 
speaker’s bouletic, teleological, or deontic ones. According to von Fintel (2006), the definitions and the 
examples of speaker’s bouletic, teleological, or deontic ordering sources are as follows. The speaker’s 
bouletic ordering source refers to “what is possible or necessary, given a person’s desires”. For example, 
if a sentence “you have to go to bed in ten minutes” is uttered by a stern father, it is in a bouletic ordering 
source. The speaker’s teleological ordering source refers to “what means are possible or necessary for 
achieving a particular goal.” For example, a sentence “to get home in time, you have to take a taxi” is in a 
bouletic ordering source. The speaker’s deontic ordering source refers to “what is possible, necessary, 
permissible, or obligatory, given a body of law or a set of moral principles or the like.” For example, 
JOPImpKc =  f g t P w.(8w0 2 O(fCG(c) [ f, g, cT , w))[P (t)(w0)],
presupposes: either (i) in c there is a salient decision problem  (c) ✓
P(W ) such that in c the imperative provides an answer to it, g is any
prioritizing ordering source, and speaker and addressee consider g the
relevant criteria for resolving   (c);
or else, (ii) in c there is no salient decision problem  (c) such that the
imperative provides an answer to it in c, and g is speaker bouletic.
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since a sentence “visitors have to leave by six pm” describes the hospital regulation, it is in a deontic 
ordering source. The important point is that such ordering sources should be mutually believed between 
the speaker and the addressee to be the relevant criteria for the decision problem. This point captures that 
it does not matter if the speaker personally does not prefer the event described by the imperative. At the 
same time, it can be also explained that the imperative is infelicitous should the speaker overtly expresses 
that the speaker does not prefer the event described by the imperative. Since the ordering sources for the 
imperatives should be the speaker’s bouletic, teleological, or deontic ones, it is awkward if overtly 
expressed, or is so obvious that the speaker does not prefer the event described by the imperative. In 
summary, the OSR (i) points out that imperatives linking to salient decision problems act as relevant 
criteria for the decision problem, and that they are infelicitous if it is obvious that imperatives do not 
correspond to the speaker’s preferences. Based on this definition of the OSR (i), let us examine the 
example (9), repeated in (11). 
 
(11) A: How do I get to Harlem?  
 B: Take the A-train. 
 B’: #Take the A-train but I don’t want you to do this. (Kaufmann, 2012 p. 159) 
 
The imperative B “take the A-train” can be analyzed by the OSR (i) since whether or not the addressee 
will take the A-train is under the addressee’s control. The event described by B is that the addressee takes 
the A-train. The imperative B acts as an advice for the question A within the context in (11). Therefore, it 
is totally possible that the speaker of B may not care whether the speaker of A takes the A-train. This 
point meets the requirement of the OSR (i) because, despite the absence of the speaker’s preference, the 
advice imperative B describes the suitable way to realize that the addressee go to Harlem. Thus, the 
imperative B can be regarded as the relevant criteria for the answer to the question A. As a result, the 
imperative B is felicitous. On the other hand, the imperative B’ is infelicitous from the viewpoint of the 
OSR (i) because the sentence “but I don’t want you to do this” overtly implies that the imperative “take 
A-train” is not what the speaker prefers. Therefore, we can see that the OSR (i) correctly explains the 
felicity and the infelicity of the imperatives B and B’ respectively.  




 ‘Go to bed!’ 
     
Imagine the following context for (12). John stays up late because he is playing a game, but his mother 
wants him to stop playing the game and go to bed. If (12) is uttered by the mother in such a situation, (12) 
generates the interpretation ‘go to bed!,’ which is the same as the literal meaning of (12). The event 
described by the imperative (12) is that John goes to bed. with respect to this, the imperative (12) should 
be analyzed with the OSR (i) because the event described by the imperative is under the addressee’s 
control. This means that (12) is not infelicitous unless it is obvious that the speaker does not prefer the 
event described by (12). In the case of (12), we see that the speaker’s preference corresponds to the event 
described by (12) and therefore, (12) meets the OSR (i).  
    Next, let us examine the definition of the OSR (ii). Unlike the imperatives we saw in (11) and (12), 
there are imperatives that are not related to a salient decision problem. The OSR (ii) is applied in such 
cases. As one of the examples of an imperative linking to no decision problem, consider the case of (13).  
 
(13) Please don’t have broken another vase!  
(Kaufmann, 2012 p.160) 
 
The imperative (13) is unique in that it refers to the past event, as indicated by the auxiliary ‘have.’ 
Because of the reference time, it acts as a wish for the past. Since the event described by the imperative is 
in the past, it is impossible for the addressee to realize the event. In other words, the event described by 
the imperative is not under the addressee’s control. Thus, the imperative (13) is considered unrelated to a 
decision problem. With respect to this, imperatives like (13) can be analyzed by the OSR (ii). The 
definition of the OSR (ii) is the following. The OSR (ii) is applicable to imperatives that are not related to 
a decision problem. In such cases, the ordering sources for the imperatives should be the speaker’s 
bouletic ones. As explained previously, speaker’s bouletic ordering source refers to “what is possible or 
necessary, given a person’s desires” (von Fintel, 2006). In summary, the OSR (ii) points out that 
imperatives linking to no salient decision problems correspond to the speaker’s preferences. Given this 
definition of the OSR (ii), the imperative (13) is felicitous because (13) expresses the speaker’s wish, that 
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is, the speaker’s preference. Therefore, we can see that the OSR (ii) can offer an explanation for the 
felicity of the example (13). 
    Section 3 overviewed two presuppositions, the EUC and the OSR, proposed by Kaufmann (2012) as 
presuppositions for imperatives. The EUC is a presupposition that points out that an imperative “p!” is 
uttered felicitously if both p and ¬p are epistemically possible. The OSR explains the relationship 
between the speaker’s preference and the event described by the imperative in terms of decision 
problems. 
 
4. RIs and Two Presuppositions: the EUC and the OSR 
 
4.1   Violation of the EUC    In this section, I will analyze RIs from the perspective of the EUC. This 
analysis will show that unlike the OIs, RIs do not satisfy the EUC. As shown in Section 3.1, the EUC is 
the presupposition that points out that “if the speaker is certain that φ is going to happen (or will not 
happen), then issuing an imperative φ! is infelicitous” (Kaufmann, 2012 p.156). 
 
(14)  The Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint (EUC) 
 
(Kaufmann, 2012 p.157) 
 
But before analyzing RIs, we must carefully consider how the EUC can be applied in the case of RIs. As 
discussed in Section 2.2, one of the distinctive characteristics of RIs is that they are uttered immediately 
after the event described by the imperative occurs. Let us briefly review this point with the example (15). 
 
(15) Baka i-e!  
 stupid say-IMP 
 ‘lit. Say a stupid thing!’ 
 
When the imperative (15) is used as a RI, the event in which the addressee says something stupid must 
have already occurred when (15) is uttered. Under such a circumstance, (15) is uttered referring to the 
past event. This trait, that is, referring to a particular past event is problematic when we try to analyze RIs 
with the EUC because the EUC was initially proposed by Kaufmann (2012) for imperatives based on the 
assumption that they were future-oriented. In addition, the evaluation of the EUC is based on a speaker’s 
belief that is time-sensitive. It means that the past events are out of the domain of the evaluation. To 
resolve this problem, I adopt Saito’s argument (2016) that the EUC is evaluated not with respect to the 
speaker’s belief, but to the common ground. The common ground is where propositions are stored, and it 
is given by context. Since context is time-insensible, we can assume that evaluation of the EUC can also 
be executed time-insensibly following the analysis by Saito (2016). It means that past events can also be 
included in the domain of the evaluation. In this paper, I will analyze RIs with this revised EUC, that is, 
the EUC that is evaluated with the common ground.  
    Based on the revised EUC, let us analyze RIs using (15) as an example. As explained previously in 
this paper, when (15) is used as a RI, it is uttered under the context in which the addressee has already 
said something stupid to the speaker. If we regard (15) baka ie! ‘say a stupid thing!’ as “p!,” p describes 
an event in which the addressee says something stupid. ¬p describes instead an event in which the 
addressee does not say something stupid. In order to meet the conditions of the EUC, both p and ¬p 
should be possible. However, in the case of (15), p has actually already occurred when the imperative “p!” 
is uttered. Therefore, there remains no possibility of ¬p, that is, the speaker has not said something stupid. 
As a result, unlike OIs, the RI (15) cannot satisfy the EUC. 
 
4.2   Violation of the OSR   In this section, I will analyze RIs from the perspective of the OSR. The 
analysis shows that, as with the case of the EUC, the RIs do not satisfy the OSR. As shown in Section 3.2, 
the OSR is the presupposition which refers to the relationship between imperatives and the speaker’s 
preference, depending on the whether there is a salient decision problem or not.  
 
(16) The Ordering Source Restriction (OSR) 
JOPImpK =  f g t P w.(8w0 2 O(fCG(c) [ f, g, cT , w))[P (t)(w0)],
presupposes: the precontext c0 of c is such that for all w 2 CS(c0) :
(9w0 2 Bel0cS (c0T )(w))(9w00 2 Bel0cS (c0T )(w))[¬p(t)(w0) & p(t)(w00)]
(= the speaker believes that both ¬p and p are possible)
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(Kaufmann, 2012 p.160) 
 
The ordering sources of the imperatives linking to a salient decision problem should be considered as the 
relevant criteria for resolving the decision problem, as pointed out in the OSR(i) above. That is, the event 
described by imperatives does not always correspond to the speaker’s preferences. However, in such 
cases, the imperatives are infelicitous if the speaker overtly expresses that he or she does not prefer the 
event described by the imperative. On the other hand, The ordering source of the imperatives linking to 
no salient decision problem should be speaker bouletic, as pointed out in the OSR (ii). In other words, the 
imperatives linking to no salient decision problem correspond to the speaker’s preferences. Based on the 
OSR, consider the example (17). 
 
(17) Uso  tsuk-e!  
 lie   tell-IMP 
 ‘lit. Tell a lie!’ 
 
The example (17) can be uttered in the following context. Mary went to a concert after school. Therefore, 
Mary did not have time for homework. Nevertheless, she tells her friend Hanako that she has finished her 
homework the next day. Since Hanako knows that Mary went to the concert, Hanako could not believe 
what Mary said. In such a case, Hanako might say to Mary (17) uso tsuke! ‘tell a lie!’ immediately after 
Hanako heard that Mary has finished her homework, to accuse Mary of telling a lie. The interpreted 
meaning of (17) can be ‘do not tell a lie,’ which is the reverse to the literal meaning. When the imperative 
(17) is uttered as a RI, it always refers to a past event in which the addressee said something unbelievable. 
Since the imperative refers to the past event, the event is not under the addressee’s control. Given this 
situation, we can say that (17) is an imperative linking to no salient decision problem. It means that in 
order for (17) to meet the OSR, its ordering source should be speaker bouletic, as described in the OSR 
(ii). In other words, the event described by (17) should correspond to the speaker’s preference. However, 
it does not correspond to the speaker’s preference in (17). The imperative (17) can be uttered as a RI to 
express a negative reaction to the addressee’s unbelievable utterance. In this sense, (17) generates the 
reverse meaning of its literal meaning and the speaker’s actual preference is also the reverse of its literal 
meaning. Thus, (17) fails to correspond to the speaker’s preference As a result, it does not satisfy the 
OSR.  
    The analysis in this section reveals that RIs are different from other imperatives with respect to the 
EUC and the OSR. Unlike the OIs, RIs do not satisfy the EUC and the OSR. Thus, we can summarize the 
characteristics of the imperatives as in the following chart: 
 
(18)2 
 ☑EUC ＊EUC 
☑OSR OIs  
＊OSR  RIs 
 
4.3   The Condition in which the Reverse Interpretation is Generated   The previous section 
discussed how RIs do not satisfy the two presuppositions the EUC and the OSR. Since the violation by 
RIs differs from the OIs, the violation might be the key for imperatives to generate a reverse 
interpretation. Then the question here is whether it is necessary to violate both the EUC and the OSR for 
the reverse interpretation, or whether the violation of either one of them is sufficient to generate a reverse 
interpretation. In this section, I will investigate the conditions in which the reverse interpretation is 
generated, and show that a reverse interpretation would never be generated unless both the EUC and the 
                                                   
2 Usually, an imperative should be infelicitous if it does not satisfy the presuppositions. However, it is still unclear 
why RIs are felicitously used even though they do not satisfy the presuppositions, the EUC and the OSR. Further 
investigations are necessary for this issue. 
JOPImpKc =  f g t P w.(8w0 2 O(fCG(c) [ f, g, cT , w))[P (t)(w0)],
presupposes: either (i) in c there is a salient decision problem  (c) ✓
P(W ) such that in c the imperative provides an answer to it, g is any
prioritizing ordering source, and speaker and addressee consider g the
relevant criteria for resolving   (c);
or else, (ii) in c there is no salient decision problem  (c) such that the
imperative provides an answer to it in c, and g is speaker bouletic.
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OSR are not satisfied. Let us consider the chart which shows the distribution of imperatives with respect 
to EUC and OSR again.  
 
(19) 
 ☑EUC ＊EUC 
☑OSR OIs (A) 
＊OSR (B) RIs 
 
In order to examine under which condition a reverse interpretation is generated in imperatives, we should 
analyze whether the imperatives which are assigned for (A) and (B) in the chart (19) would generate a 
reverse interpretation. (A) refers to imperatives which do not satisfy the EUC, but satisfy the OSR. In 
contrast, (B) refers to imperatives which do not satisfy the OSR, but satisfy the EUC. In order to consider 
the imperatives in these conditions, let us consider the example (20), with the possible situations shown in 
(21a) and (21b). 
 
(20) Paati-ni  ik-e-yo!  
 Party-to  go-IMP-SFP 
   ‘go to the party!’  
 
(21) a. The addressee is in Japan now, but a party in the USA will begin in 2 hours, and the speaker  
      wants the addressee to go to the party. The addressee knows that the speaker wants the addressee  
      to go to the party. 
b. The addressee insists on going to a party, but the party does not seem to be worth going in the  
  speaker’s opinion. The addressee knows that the speaker does not want the addressee to go to the  
  party. 
 
The interpretation of the imperative (20) depends on the situations in which they are uttered. Let us first 
consider the situation (21a). Imagine that the addressee is in Japan now but a party in the USA will begin 
in 2 hours, and the speaker wants the addressee to go to the party. When we regard (20) paati-ni ike-yo! 
‘go to the party!’ as “p!,” p depicts an event in which the addressee goes to the party. ¬p depicts instead 
an event in which the addressee does not go to the party. If (20) is uttered in the situation described in 
(21a), the EUC is not satisfied because the speaker knows that it is impossible for the addressee to 
participate in the party, that is, the speaker knows that p would never happen. On the other hand, the OSR 
is satisfied. In the situation (21a), it is impossible for the addressee to go to the USA in 2 hours. Thus, the 
event described by (20) is not under the addressee’s control. This means that (20) should be evaluated 
with respect to the OSR (ii), which is used for imperatives linking to no salient decision problems. In 
other words, (20) satisfies the OSR if the event described by (20) corresponds to the speaker’s preference. 
In the case of (20) under the situation (21a), the literal meaning of the imperative corresponds to the 
speaker’s preference, that is, the addressee will go to the party. Therefore, (20) satisfies the OSR. Since 
the imperative (20) under the condition (21a) does not satisfy the EUC but satisfies the OSR, we can 
regard it as an example of the imperative (A) in the chart (19). As a matter of fact, however, the 
imperative (20) under the condition (21a) is infelicitous. From this observation, it can be said that 
imperatives (A) result in infelicitous utterances, and it cannot generate a reverse interpretation. 
    Next, let us see the imperatives (20) under the situation (21b). Suppose that the addressee insists on 
going to a party, but the party does not seem to be worth going in the speaker’s opinion. The addressee 
knows that the speaker does not want the addressee to go to the party. In such a situation, (20) generates 
the interpretation which is the same as the literal meaning of (20), but it is more sarcastic than the literal 
meaning. When we regard (20) paati-ni ike-yo! ‘go to the party!’ as “p!,” p depicts an event in which the 
addressee goes to the party. ¬p depicts instead an event in which the addressee does not go to the party. If 
(20) is uttered in the situation described in (21b), the EUC is satisfied because it is not sure whether the 
addressee will go to the party or not, that is, whether p will occur or ¬p will occur. On the other hand, it 
does not meet the OSR. Since the event described by the (20) under the condition (21b) is under the 
addressee’s control, it should be evaluated with respect to the OSR (i), which is used for imperatives 
linking to a salient decision problem. This means that (20) cannot satisfy the OSR if it is obvious that the 
speaker does not prefer the event described by (20). In the case of (20) under the situation of (21b), the 
speaker’s preference is that the addressee will not go to the party. This preference is obvious for both the 
speaker and the addressee in the situation (21b). Nevertheless, the literal meaning is in contradiction to 
the preference. Thus, (20) under the situation (21b) does not meet the OSR. Since the imperative (20) 
under the situation (21b) satisfies the EUC but does not satisfy the OSR, this imperative can be regarded 
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as one of the examples of the imperative (B) in the chart (19). As mentioned briefly, the imperative (20) 
under the situation (21b) can at least generate the sarcastic meaning, but it does not generate the reverse 
interpretation which is as salient as RIs’. The considerable difference between the sarcastic meaning of 
(20) under (21b) and the reverse interpretations in RIs is that, while the speaker of (20) gives up his or her 
first preference when the imperative is uttered, the speaker of RIs does not.  
    Let us take a look at one more example on imperative (B), which does not meet the OSR, but 
satisfies the EUC.  
 
(22) (Okashi-o)    tabe-te-nasai! 
    sweets-ACC   eat-PROG-IMP.POL 
    ‘Keep eating sweets!’ 
 
The example (22) tabetenasai! ‘keep eating sweets!’ is an imperative which consists of an imperative 
(okashi-o) tabenasai! ‘eat (sweets)!’ and the progressive aspect teiru. Thus, it approximately corresponds 
to ‘keep eating (sweets)!’ in English. As for the context for (22), suppose that there is a boy named Jiro, 
who has to lose his weight. One day, however, his mother finds that he is secretly eating sweets in his 
room, and she really becomes angry about that. As in the case of (20) under (21b), (22) also generates the 
interpretation which is the same as the literal meaning of (22) but actually has a sarcastic meaning in such 
a situation. When we regard (22) (okashi-o) tabetenasai! ‘keep eating (sweets)!’ as “p!,” p describes the 
event in which the addressee keeps eating sweets. ¬p depicts instead an event in which the addressee does 
not keep eating. If the mother says to him, (22) (okashi-o) tabetenasai! ‘keep eating sweets!,’ it actually 
satisfies the EUC. At first glance, it does not seem to satisfy the EUC because when the imperative (22) is 
uttered, the event in which Jiro eats sweets has already occurred. However, this does not mean that it is 
certain Jiro will ‘keep’ eating sweets. Thus, there remain both possibilities of p and ¬p, which means the 
imperative (22) satisfies the EUC. On the other hand, the imperative (22) does not satisfy the OSR. Since 
the event described by (22) is under the addressee’s control, (22) should be evaluated with respect to the 
OSR (i), which is used for imperatives linking to a salient decision problem. This means that (22) does 
not satisfy the OSR if it is obvious that the speaker does not prefer the event described by (22). In the case 
of (22), while the literal meaning orders the addressee to keep eating, the speaker’s preference is in 
contradiction to the literal meaning. Since the speaker’s preference is obvious for both the speaker and the 
addressee, the imperative (22) fails to satisfy the OSR. As in the case of imperative (20) under the 
situation (21b), the imperative (22) also generates a sarcastic meaning, but in this case, too, the speaker 
gives up her first preference when the imperative (22) is uttered. Therefore, unlike RIs, the imperative 
(22) does not generate the reverse interpretation. What was revealed by the example (20) under (21b) and 
(22) is that only a violation of the OSR cannot generate the reverse interpretation, which means, 
imperatives (B) in the chart (19) cannot generate a reverse interpretation.  
   As a matter of fact, almost the same example as (20) under the condition (21b) in English is 
introduced by Kaufmann (2012) as a concession, which is not discussed as much in Kaufmann (2012). 
The example shown in Kaufmann (2012) follows: 
 
(23) Well then go to that damn party! 
 
We notice that example (23) includes ‘then.’ Actually, the examples in (20) under the condition (21b) and 
(22) sounds more natural when they are preceded by sonnan nara, which means ‘then.’ Here I speculate 
that the reason why they sound more natural when ‘then’ precedes the imperatives is that ‘then’ overtly 
describes that the speaker gives up his or her first preference. In this sense, the examples (20) under the 
condition (21b) and (22) can be considered as concessions, same as (23). Thus, in this paper, I consider 
the imperatives which do not satisfy the OSR but satisfy the EUC as concessions.  
    The analysis in this section reveals that the reverse interpretation cannot be generated unless both the 
EUC and the OSR are not satisfied. Only the violation of either of them cannot generate the reverse 
interpretation. Based on the analysis in this section, the distribution of the imperatives with respect to the 
EUC and the OSR is as follows: 
 
(24) 
 ☑EUC ＊EUC 
☑OSR OIs Infelicitous 
＊OSR Concessions RIs 
 
    In Section 4, we have seen that RIs do not satisfy both the EUC and the OSR. It is also proved that 
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the violation of either of the EUC or the OSR is not sufficient to generate the reverse interpretation. Only 
the violation of the EUC results in the infelicitous utterance, and only the violation of the OSR results in 
concession.  
 
5. The Interpretation of the Reverse Meaning on a Pragmatic Level 
 
5.1   The Interpretation of RIs on a Semantic Level   In this section, I will investigate how the 
reverse interpretation is generated in RIs. Let us first think about the interpretation of RIs on a semantic 
level. As mentioned previously, Kaufmann (2012) argues that an imperative sentence can be semantically 
denoted as a proposition of performative you should sentences. I consider the semantics of RIs is the same 
as the semantics of the OIs. For instance, an OI (yasaimo) tabenasai! ‘eat (vegetables), too!’ can be 
denoted as ‘you should eat (vegetables), too’ semantically. The RI baka ie! ‘say a stupid thing!,’ is the 
same on the semantic level, for it is interpreted as the proposition with performative should ‘you should 
say a stupid thing.’ The reason why they are analyzed in the same way on the semantic level is that RIs 
sometimes fails to be interpreted as the reverse meaning, especially when it comes to the conversation 
with little children or people with intellectual disability. In such cases, the factor of the misunderstanding 
may be that the OIs and RIs semantically have the same meanings. Therefore, I assume that the different 
interpretation between the OIs and RIs can be generated due to pragmatic factors.  
 
5.2   The Information which should be Shared in Advance   Let us explore the information which 
should be shared in advance for the interpretation of the reverse meaning on the pragmatic level. As for 
the difference of OIs and RIs, I use the case of ordinary questions and rhetorical questions as a reference. 
According to Capnigro & Sprouse (2007), ordinary questions and rhetorical questions are the same in that 
they both are questions semantically. The difference is generated on the pragmatic level. While the 
answers to the questions are not the part of the common ground in ordinary imperatives’ case, the answer 
is already in the common ground in the rhetorical questions’ case. Because of the information shared in 
common ground in advance to the utterance, rhetorical questions do not require the answers. This analysis 
suggests that certain information should be shared in advance for the interpretation of the rhetorical 
meaning. 
    RIs are the same in that the reverse meaning in RIs would not be interpreted successfully if the 
certain information is not shared in advance. Look at example (1).  
 
(25) Fuzaker-o!  
 joke.around-IMP 
 ‘lit. Joke around!’ 
 
The example (25) fuzaker-o! ‘joke around!’ is one of the imperatives which can be used as a RI. The 
possible situation is as follows. John has finished his senior thesis one month before the due, but Hanako 
is still working on hers. She envies that John is now free from his senior thesis. Moreover, she says to 
John “please write one more senior thesis for me” as a joke. If (25) is uttered by John immediately after 
Hanako’s utterance, (25) is expected to generate the reverse interpretation ‘don’t joke around!’. However, 
there are possible situations in which such an interpretation is not generated as expected. Imagine that the 
addressee does not know which of his or her utterance corresponds to the event in which the addressee 
jokes around. In other words, if the addressee is not aware that he or she has joked around to the speaker, 
it is impossible for the addressee to understand which event the speaker refers to by the utterance (25). In 
fact, RIs are almost always uttered immediately after the event described by the imperative occurred but 
seldom uttered long after the event. Otherwise, it is difficult for the addressee to know which of his or her 
utterance corresponds to the event described by the speaker. Actually, if the addressee is aware that he or 
she has joked around to the speaker, the literal meaning of (25) sounds redundant because the event has 
already occurred before the imperative is uttered. Therefore, it is highly awkward to interpret the literal 
meaning of (25) as it is. Conversely, if the addressee is not aware of the redundancy, it is natural to 
interpret (25) as it conveys the literal meaning. As a result, the reverse interpretation cannot be generated.  
    There is one more possible situation in which the reverse interpretation may not be successfully 
generated. Think about the case that the addressee does not know that joking around to the speaker makes 
the speaker have bad moods. Such a situation is seldom observed in our conversation because joking 
around is not regarded as a good thing in our common sense. If the imperative (25), however, is uttered 
under such a condition, it is difficult to be aware of the awkwardness of the literal meaning of (25), that is, 
the inconsistency between the literal meaning of the utterance and the possible speaker’s preference. Thus, 
in such a case, too, the interpretation of the reverse meaning may not take place.  
    What is suggested by imperative (25) is that, for the reverse interpretation, the awareness of the 
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awkwardness is important. In order to feel awkward with literal meanings of RIs, it is necessary to know 
what event is referred to by the speaker, and that the event described by the literal meaning of the 
imperative makes the speaker feel bad. Thus, as is the case with rhetorical questions, these kinds of 
information should be in the common ground of the addressee and the speaker in advance to the 
interpretation of RIs.  
 
5.3   The Process of the Generation of the Reverse Interpretation with Cooperative Principle
 Based on what kind of information should be shared for the interpretation of RIs, let us now investigate 
the step of the interpretation of the reverse meaning. I adopt the cooperative principle (Grice, 1975) for 
the analysis, especially focusing on the Maxim of Quantity and Quality. The definitions of the Maxim of 
Quantity and Quality are the following: 
 
(26) a. The Maxim of Quantity: Make your contributions as informative as is required. Do not make your 
      contribution more informative than is required.  
 b. The Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true. Do not say what you  
   believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
 
    As a matter of fact, RIs violate both of the maxims in (26). First, (26a) the Maxim of Quantity is 
violated because when RIs are uttered, the events described by the imperatives have already occurred. It 
means that the redundant contents are uttered. The Maxim of Quality in (26b) is violated because RIs do 
not correspond to the speaker’s preference. It means that the speaker believes the literal meaning of the 
utterance is not true.  
    With respect to the violation of the two maxims, the reverse interpretation is generated in the 
following steps in (27): 
 
(27) Step 1: The speaker is a cooperative conversational partner.  
 Step 2: Therefore, she or he is trying to convey some information that is useful. 
 Step 3: The sentence is infelicitous because it conveys redundant information, and it does not     
       correspond to the speaker’s preference. 
 Step 4: Therefore, the sentence cannot mean what it says literally. 
 Step 5: Thus, the speaker expects me to fill in some unsaid meaning that will make the sentence   
       meaningful. 
 
Among the five steps in (27), Step 3 corresponds to the violation of the Maxim of Quantity and Quality. 
The violation of the Maxim of Quantity is indicated by the former part in Step 3 “it conveys the redundant 
information,” and the violation of the Maxim of Quality is indicated by the latter part in Step 3 “it does 
not correspond to the speaker’s preference.” As a result of the steps above, the reverse interpretation is 
generated in RIs on the pragmatic level.  
    In Section 5, we have discussed how the reverse interpretation is generated in RIs. The analysis 
argued that the reverse interpretation is generated not on the semantic level but the pragmatic level. It is 
also pointed out that certain information should be shared in advance for the interpretation of the reverse 
meaning. That is, the addressee should be aware of what event is referred to by the speaker, and that the 
event described by the literal meaning of the imperative makes the speaker feel bad. As for the 
interpretation of RIs on the pragmatic level, I used the cooperative principle by Grice (1975). Based on 
the cooperative principle, I argued that the reverse interpretation is generated by the violation of the 




    In this paper, I have examined RIs from the viewpoint of semantics and pragmatics. The analysis has 
revealed that, unlike the OIs, RIs do not satisfy the two presuppositions: the EUC and the OSR. The 
reverse interpretation would not be generated unless both the EUC and the OSR are failed to be satisfied. 
As for the interpretation of the reverse meaning, it is not generated on the semantic level. Yet, storing 
certain information in common ground in advance enables the successful interpretation of the reverse 
meaning. Then the reverse interpretation is generated on the pragmatic level, by the violation of the two 
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